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Abstract
Despite being found guilty of egregious acts, crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
54 of the 90 perpetrators sentenced by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (icty) were granted unconditional early release (uer). This article 
argues that uer did a disservice to two principal expressive purposes of punishment 
- moral condemnation of the crimes and the overall norm projected by the icty, 
the ‘universal repugnance of group-based killing’. Fundamentally, punishment of 
perpetrators signifies the inherent worth of victims. Interviews with key stakeholders 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina revealed that the interviewees largely concurred with 
authors who posit that punitive justice conveys valuable messages to audiences. 
This article complements expressivist theories by demonstrating the extent to which 
expressivism was negated as perpetrators were granted uer. Finally, it proposes how 
early release in future tribunals and courts might be tailored to counter the negation 
of international criminal justice’s expressive value.
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Between 1998 and 2018, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (icty) granted unconditional early release (uer) to 54 of the 90 
persons it had found guilty of atrocity crimes, usually after serving two-thirds of 
their sentence.1 This article argues that granting uer to unrepentant perpetra-
tors did a disservice to the two principal expressive purposes of punishment - 
moral condemnation of the crimes and the overall norm projected by the 
Tribunal - the norm being, in the words of Drumbl, the ‘universal repugnance 
of group based killing’.2 This argument is based on the analysis of interview 
data which largely concurred with authors who posit that the most fitting 
purpose of punishment for atrocity crimes is its expressive capacity. These 
expressivist theorists assert that punitive justice conveys valuable messages 
to audiences.3 The extent to which these ‘justificatory theories’4 are realised – 
that these messages are conveyed and understood by the audiences - when 
punishment is dispensed remains empirically unexplored in the international 
criminal justice field.5 This article addresses this lacuna as it reports findings 
from one case study, that of selected stakeholders of the icty in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH). In doing so it proposes that, despite atrocity crimes being 
of a different nature to ordinary serious crimes, there is a fundamental mes-
sage that is common to both: the vindication of the value of the victim. This 
1 As of February 2017. See: https://www.irmct.org/en/about/functions/enforcement-
ofsentences, accessed 3 December 2019. Between 1998 and 2013 UER was granted by the 
ICTY President, and thereafter by the UN’s International Residual Mechanism for Criminal 
Tribunals’ President. In January 2019 the UNIRMCT introduced conditions upon release. 
This article is based on one chapter of the author’s doctoral dissertation, P. Yarnell, Ending 
Justice Early in The Hague: The Unconditional Early Release of Perpetrators Convicted by 
the ICTY (Ulster University, June 2020). I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all 
interviewees in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to Aldijana for scheduling, interpreting 
and transcribing many of these interviews. A special thanks to Professor Bill Rolston for 
constructive feedback.
2 Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Crime and Punishment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007), p. 174.
3 Diane Marie Amann, ‘Message as Medium in Sierra Leone’, 7(2) ILSA Journal of 
International & Comparative Law (Spring 2001) 237–246; Bill Wringe, ‘Why Punish War 
Criminals? Victor’s Justice and Expressive Justifications of Punishment’, 25 Law and 
Philosophy (2006) 159–191; Drumbl, ibid.; Robert Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of 
International Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of 
International Criminal Law’, 43 Stanford Journal of International Law (2007) 39–94; Kristen 
Fisher, Moral Accountability and International Criminal Law: Holding Agents of Atrocity 
Crimes Accountable to the World (Routledge, Abingdon, 2012).
4 Fisher, ibid.
5 Tim Meijers and Marlies Glasius, ‘Trials as Messages of Justice: What Should Be Expected 
of International Criminal Courts?’, 30(4) Ethics and International Affairs (2016) 444.
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proposal contributes further to these theories of punishment’s expressive 
capacity by proposing the reason why the universal repugnance of group-
based killing is an existing norm that should be articulated. It does so on the 
basis that international criminal justice continues to be a means by which at 
least some perpetrators of atrocities are held to account.
Section 2 clarifies why the icty’s practice of uer was problematic and 
required exploration, and explains how this exploration was undertaken. 
Section 3 considers those authors who have argued that international crimi-
nal justice’s most valuable asset is its expressive capacity rather than its ability 
to fulfil just deserts or deter criminals in punishing – although they are not 
exclusive.6 Section 4 provides an analysis of data from semi-structured inter-
views in BiH which illustrate the widespread belief that the primary purpose 
of the icty’s punishment was its symbolic condemnation of the crimes. This 
section proposes why this condemnation held significance for stakeholders 
and it draws on Hampton’s proposition that punishment provides a specific 
expression, a vindication of the victims, which these interviewees in effect ref-
erenced. Section 5 concludes with recommendations for future International 
Criminal Tribunals (icts), the International Criminal Court (icc), and any 
domestic courts dealing with atrocity crimes to tailor early release in a fash-
ion which counters the negation of international criminal justice’s expressive 
capacity, its authoritative moral condemnation of the crimes and the norm 
projected as a result.
2 Exploring the Problem with the icty’s Grant of Unconditional 
Early Release
First, on a normative basis, there was an irony that perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes were treated more generously than perpetrators of serious crimes in a 
domestic law setting as they were released unconditionally. The widespread 
national practice is release on probation, parole or conditional release, where 
perpetrators’ behaviour is monitored, and they can be returned to jail if they 
breach any conditions. Further, this more favourable treatment violated the 
principle of proportionality: ‘that for a system of punishments as a whole to 
be just, serious crimes should … be punished more severely than less serious 
ones’.7
6 Henry L.A. Hart, ‘Aims of Criminal Law’, 23 Law & Contemporary Problems (1958) 401–441.
7 Wringe, supra note 3, 185.
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Second, on a more societal level, due to its unconditional nature, perpetra-
tors were free to return to the crime scene where they were often greeted as 
heroes by welcoming crowds of jubilant supporters8 but to the dismay of others, 
exemplified by protestors on one occasion sewing their lips shut in protest.9 The 
research was primarily motivated by a desire to understand the extent to which 
this practice had any societal impact on a post-conflict, ethnically divided 
country.10 It did so on the basis that the icty had recognised the population of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (sfry) as stakeholders in the justice 
process as they asserted that ‘it will be essential for the ordinary citizens of the 
region … to be satisfied that justice has been achieved’.11 As uer effectively cut 
short retributive justice, an examination was required of the extent to which 
audiences in BiH perceived uer as having an impact on justice.
In order to understand the societal impact in BiH, 51 interviews were con-
ducted with a range of stakeholders, totalling 57 individuals. Semi-structured 
interviews were held with 10 judges (all but one were deciding war crimes 
cases); 10 prosecutors and four defence lawyers working on war crimes cases; 
20 non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society organisations (CSOs) 
and victims’ associations (VAs) working on victim and conflict related mat-
ters; five staff from Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs)12 and five inde-
pendent experts.13 Interviews were voluntary and many interviewees did not 
respond, suggesting that those interviewed had an interest in the topic and a 
desire to share their opinion – generally negative. Therefore, it may be the case 
that those people who did not respond were, at least, not dissatisfied with uer. 
8 Jonathan Choi, ‘Early Release in International Criminal Law’, 123 The Yale Law Journal 
(2014) 1783–1784; Jovana Mihajlović Trbovc, ‘Homecomings from The Hague: Media 
Coverage of ICTY Defendants After Trial and Punishment’, 28(4) International Criminal 
Justice Review (2018) 406–422.
9 Choi, ibid., 1784.
10 Florian Beiber, Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance (UNRISD 
and Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006); Constance Grewe and Michael Riegner, 
‘Internationalized Constitutionalism in Ethnically Divided Societies: Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Kosovo Compared’, in Armin Bogdandy and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.), 15(1) Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law (Brill, Leiden, 2011) pp. 1–64.
11 icty Annual Report, 2000, para. 195.
12 Two EU staff members interviewed separately; one senior staff from the Council of Europe 
and one senior staff member from the undp.
13 Interviews with: professional who had worked with victims of conflict-related sexual 
violence; professional who had worked with victim-witnesses in Srebrenica; professional 
working in an independent state institution with extensive experience in IGOs; 
independent investigative journalist; and independent lawyer, who previously worked 
with the Tribunal in BiH.
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Consequently, these findings do not claim to be representative of the entire 
population of BiH, which may have been asserted if a random sampling survey 
had been conducted – but they do present a deep analysis which captures a 
snapshot of stakeholders’ perceptions of uer at a time and place, discusses 
patterns of shared perceptions and proposes why these perceptions were held. 
Further, interviewees, with one exception, perceived the icty as a legitimate 
institution despite the practice of uer. Arguably, therefore they were inclined 
to hold the belief that international criminal justice was a valid response to 
atrocity crimes. Although this is a statistically biased sample, the interviewees 
reinforced the conclusions of those authors, detailed below, who are in favour 
of punishment for atrocity crimes, and who propound its expressive capacity. 
First, however, before considering the research results, the general theory of 
legal expressivism is addressed.
3 The Expressive Value of Punishment
This section outlines the different strands of ‘instrumental expressivism’,14 spe-
cifically those advocated by Hampton, Drumbl, Luban, Wringe and Fisher, who 
have justified punishment based on its positive expressive capacity. They assert 
that criminal justice holds symbolic value and is ‘norm-nurturing’.15 Other 
authors (including Amann, Douglas, Meijers and Glasius), who highlight pun-
ishment’s expressive capacity explore the messages we get from law. For them, 
‘the message understood, rather than the message intended, is critical’.16 These 
authors’ arguments, although important, especially in relation to post-conflict 
society, are not addressed here.17 Here, the instrumental expressivists’ theories 
are explained as the research’s empirical findings illustrate how some expres-
sive values are indeed messaged through punishment and are negated as per-
petrators are granted uer.18
Core to all expressive theories is the understanding that ‘actions … carry 
meaning’,19 thus ‘every action is also a gesture’.20 This implies that actions do 
14 Barrie Sander, ‘The expressive turn of international criminal justice: A field in search of 
meaning’, 32(4) Leiden Journal of International Law (2019) 853.
15 Sander, ibid., 857.
16 Amann, supra note 3, 238.
17 Forthcoming article, ‘The Messages of UER’.
18 Sander, supra note 14.
19 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘On the Expressive Function of Law’, 144(5) University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review (1996) 2021–2053.
20 David Garland, Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1990), p. 255.
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not occur in a vacuum; they are observed. In terms of institutions they act and 
have a societal audience. Legal institutions which adjudicate, and sometimes 
develop, laws send messages as they do so. Sunstein, elucidating on the ‘expres-
sive function of law’, reasoned that legal institutions’ actions are an identifica-
tion of the ‘norms to which [its society] is committed’ or their fundamental 
‘principles’.21 Similarly, Anderson and Pildes noted that ‘expressive theories tell 
actors … to act in ways that express appropriate attitudes toward … substantive 
values’.22 This can be done through legal codification of what society defines 
as its positive, substantive values. Sunstein provides an apt example: ‘a society 
might … insist on an antidiscrimination law for expressive reasons even if it 
does not know whether the law actually helps … minority groups’.23 What is 
important is not the consequences of the law but the symbolism of the law.24 
Antidiscrimination laws symbolise that the society is a tolerant one whereby 
all citizens are considered equal. Just as the law proscribes positive values it 
can also make ‘statements’25 of what beliefs it rejects by making certain acts 
unlawful.
Criminal law and its sanctions, ranging from a suspended sentence up to 
life imprisonment, is a ‘prime arena for the expressive function of the law’.26 
Punishment is a message;27 it not only signals that certain acts are wrong but 
the degree to which they are deemed wrong. As Kahan argued, the symbolic 
nature of the deprivation of liberty ‘explains why non-evocative sanctions 
such as fines are regarded as inappropriate substitutes for more evocative ones 
such as imprisonment’.28 In taking this position, since perpetrators of atrocity 
crimes are guilty of grievous and mass crimes, a lengthy term of imprisonment 
appears to be a necessity otherwise the message of condemnation could be 
‘readily be interpreted as empty rhetoric’.29
 Imprisonment, depriving an individual of their liberty and removing them 
from society, is an equivocal denunciation of the criminal’s actions that led 
21 Sunstein, supra note 19, 2028.
22 Elizabeth S. Anderson and Richard H. Pildes, ‘Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement’, 148(5) University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2000) 1504.




27 Carsten Stahn, Justice as Message: Expressivist Foundations of International Criminal Justice 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020).
28 Dan M. Kahan, ‘The Secret Ambition of Deterrence’, 113(2) Harvard Law Review (1999) 420.
29 Meijers and Glasius supra note 5, 436.
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them there. This is cited as the ‘moral denunciation’30 justification of pun-
ishment. As Hart noted, imprisonment is a means by which the law acts on 
behalf of the community to resolutely express its ‘existing shared community 
values’.31 Durkheim referred to these existing shared values as the ‘conscience 
collective’ and posited that punishment was an intuitive response to those 
who transgress them and is manifested in the ‘palpable symbol’ of punish-
ment.32 This echoes Hart’s description of punishment: ‘condemnation plus the 
added consequences … [are] considered … compendiously’.33 Disapproval is 
an essential ingredient of punishment.
This ‘expression of moral outrage against non-conformity’34 is a reaffir-
mation of shared social norms. Punishing those who violate these norms is 
a means by which society stays true to them. This denunciation is, therefore, 
normative35 – a should be response to what is wrong. Feinberg, who appears 
to have coined the term the ‘expressive function of punishment’, asserted that 
it symbolised an ‘authoritative disavowal’.36 Additionally, not only is punish-
ing simply the right thing to do, if a legal system does not punish those who 
transgress its norms it is effectively acquiescing to them.37 On plain reading 
of this justification, or motivation, punishment is solely backward-looking, a 
means by which to address the wrong, to denounce it, allowing society to rid 
themselves of being complicit in it. However, consequentialist expressivists 
identify forward-looking components, including educative purposes, so long 
as the message is understood by those who observe it.
As the message of punishment is projected it is observed by audiences, one 
being the society whose norms are being affirmed. Society is not homogenous 
and social norms are not necessarily shared by all individuals within it which, 
indeed, the perpetrator’s crimes illustrate. Therefore, this affirmation of the 
30 Robert Cryer, ‘The Aims, Objectives and Justifications of International Criminal Law’, 
in Robert Cryer, Håkan Friman, Darryl Robinson, Elizabeth Wilmshurst (eds.), An 
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014); Naomi Roht-Arriaza (ed.), Impunity and Human Rights in International 
Law and Practice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995).
31 Hart, supra note 6.
32 Emile Durkheim, Moral Education: A Study in the Theory and Application of the Sociology of 
Education (Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1961) p. 176.
33 Hart, supra note 6, 405.
34 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 30, p.17.
35 Pildes and Anderson, supra note 22, 1527.
36 Joel Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment’, in Doing and Deserving, Essays in 
the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1970) p. 103.
37 Ibid.
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general law is also a means of ‘educating’ members of ‘society about the unac-
ceptable nature of the conduct condemned’.38 Authors argue that punishment 
is a moral educator which can assist in ‘bringing the wrongdoers to acknowl-
edge their misdeeds and … provid[e] moral guidance more generally’.39 
Different authors focus on these different audiences and explore the extent to 
which they can be morally educated.40 On this reading of punishment, moral 
denunciation serves a purpose, and thus is consequentialist. When persons 
are educated, they should act in accordance with the correct understanding of 
these norms. Moral education is ‘at its best … directed toward character devel-
opment rather than rule obedience’.41 The notion that punishment informs a 
person’s character through education rather than fear implies that they under-
stand why the behaviour is unacceptable. Just as the length of sentence signi-
fies how much the community judges the wrong,42 the message clarifies why it 
was wrong. Therefore, the message has to be elucidated.
In criminal law those punished have been found responsible for causing 
harm to another. According to Hampton, the deliberate infliction of harm 
on another signifies that the perpetrator believed the victim is of lesser value 
than them. After all, they would not wish to be harmed themselves, and if they 
believed the victim equal, they would not have harmed the victim. Punishment 
as a response to the infliction of harm intrinsically recognises victims. Authors 
who justify punishment on the basis of it being a form of victims’ ‘redress’43 
reason that it is a means by which society acknowledges the victim’s value - 
expressing to the victim, the perpetrator and society at large that all human 
beings have equal value. On this symbolic basis Hampton argued that pun-
ishment was the correct ‘response to a wrong … [as it] … not only repudiates 
the action’s message of superiority over the victim but does so in a way that 
confirms them as equal by virtue of their humanity’.44
Although the feature of creating victims is shared between ordinary serious 
crimes and atrocity crimes, there are marked differences. First, at the practical 
38 Lucia Zedner, Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), p. 109. Emphasis 
added.
39 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 30, p. 17.
40 Antony Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001).
41 Samuel H. Pillsbury, ‘Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment’, 
74 Cornell Law Review (1988–1989), 681.
42 Kahan, supra note 28, 420.
43 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 30, p. 18.
44 Jean Hampton, ‘Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution’, 39 
UCLA Law Review (1992) 1686.
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level, atrocities result in mass victimisation, and not all victims will see their 
perpetrators prosecuted. Second, and especially in cases of ethnic conflict, the 
nature of the crime is specific. With these core differences many argue that the 
usual justifications for punishment in national settings is not easily transferra-
ble to the context of international criminal law (icl).45 Third, the justice sys-
tem and the relevant stakeholders are different. The ‘theatre’46 of international 
criminal justice is located outside of the ‘normal workings of the established 
legal systems of states trying their own citizens’.47 With these marked differ-
ences, the usual justifications, such as retribution and deterrence, are not per-
suasive. An eye for an eye cannot mirror mass victimisation, and punishment’s 
deterrent effect - the threat of punishment by an external institution from 
committing acts which are specifically propagated by political elites - appear 
misplaced. These arguments are convincingly debated elsewhere.48
Several proponents who justify international criminal justice do so in 
terms of its expressive qualities’,49 that it sends important messages. Many 
take as a starting point Feinberg’s proposition of punishment’s ‘functions’50 as 
being symbolic ‘disavowal, non-acquiescence, vindication, and absolution’.51 
Feinberg’s work does not relate to icl but is transferable as he provides an 
example of a government punishing a citizen of its own country for violating 
the rights of another state’s citizen. Feinberg’s two elements are relevant in the 
context of icl: first, the authoritative disavowal of the crime (moral denun-
ciation), and second, the vindication of the law. Sloane, advocating for icl to 
emphasise its expressive value, paraphrased Feinberg’s validation of the law 
argument to read, in this context, as being a means to ‘vindicate international 
human rights norms and the laws of war’.52 Sloane argued that international 
human rights law (ihrl) has ‘reconceptualized international humanitarian 
law, in substantial part, as the human rights component of the laws of war … 
45 Mark J. Osiel, ‘Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity’, 22 Human Rights 
Quarterly (2000) 118–141; Immi Tallgren, ‘The Sense and Sensibility of International 
Criminal Law’, 13 European Journal of International Law (2002) 561–595.
46 Marlies Glasius and Francesco Colona, ‘The Yugoslavia Tribunal: The Moving Targets of 
Legal Theatre’, in Dino Abazović and Mitja Velikonja (eds.) Post-Yugoslavia: New Cultural 
and Political Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014).
47 Wringe, supra note 3, 162.
48 This article need not repeat them as its contribution is to demonstrate that another 
purpose of punishment, expressivism, is the most appropriate justification for punishing 
perpetrators of atrocity crimes.
49 Sander, supra note 14, 853.
50 Wringe, supra note 3, 176.
51 Feinberg, supra note 36, p. 115.
52 Sloane, supra note 3, 71 - altering Feinberg’s ‘validation of law’.
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[guaranteeing] … minimal levels of human dignity and decency even in times 
of systematic violence’.53 Sloane’s use of the word ‘dignity’ connects icl with 
the notion of vindication of the victim’s worth. When people are punished for 
violating the dignity of others, it affirms the person’s dignity which the perpe-
trator has violated. Duff has argued that victims are the reason punishment 
should be meted out in cases of atrocity crimes, where states are unwilling 
or unable to punish perpetrators under their jurisdiction. Duff stated simply: 
‘some kind of crimes are properly our business, in virtue of our shared human-
ity with their victims’.54 Implicitly, both Sloane and Duff recognise that victims 
are at the heart of international criminal justice, it being an instinctive reac-
tion to fellow humans, beyond state boundaries, who have had their dignity 
gravely violated on a massive scale. It goes against the universal norm of the 
‘fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person’.55
During times of mass atrocity, which requires mass participation, atrocity 
crimes are not necessarily considered deviant,56 nor are they necessarily con-
sidered as such after the war has concluded. This was recognised by the icty’s 
first President Cassese as he justified icts. He argued that they were, in gen-
eral, a means to validate universal values even when these ‘peremptory norms 
of international law ( jus cogens)’ were not held by an institution’s constituents 
[as they] are, nevertheless, ‘based on the values common to the whole com-
munity within which the institution lives and operates’.57 Thus, international 
society, the community of states, requires that these peremptory norms be val-
idated in instances where they have been skewed by a state’s ruling elites. As 
Luban argued, the norm messaged - what he calls ‘international criminal law’s 
moral truth’ - is the ‘criminality of political violence against the innocent, even 
when your side hates the innocent as an enemy’.58
Meijers and Glasius described icts as a means to ‘help to transform 
these values and contribute to forging a new social order’.59 In contrast, the 
53 Sloane, ibid., 81.
54 Antony Duff, ‘Authority and Responsibility in International Criminal Law’, in Samantha 
Besson and John Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010), p. 601 referencing Raimond Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute 
Conception (Macmillan, London, 1991).
55 Preamble of the UN Charter, 1945.
56 Drumbl, supra note 2, p. 8.
57 Antonio Cassese, ‘Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the Current 
Prospects of International Criminal Justice’, 25(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 
(2012), 492.
58 David Luban, ‘Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of 
International Criminal Law’, in Besson and Tasioulas (eds.), supra note 54, p. 577.
59 Meijers and Glasius, supra note 5, 438.
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argument presented here is that rather that forging a new social order, icl’s 
message is a reaffirmation of the fundamental values that were corrupted dur-
ing the conflict – it is not that societies did not have these values beforehand. 
As Sikkink noted, ‘prohibition of murder, rape and other violent crimes exist in 
the criminal law of virtually all societies and cultures, there are obvious moral 
rules for which people believe that punishment is deserved’.60 Although not all 
societies ascribe to non-discriminatory laws and practices, the Criminal Code 
of the sfry prohibited murder and violent crimes. Specifically in relation to 
war crimes, they were punishable for a term of five to 15 years or, for the most 
serious cases, the death penalty.61 What was different about the ‘atrocity envi-
ronment’ was ‘contempt for the law [and] for the victims’.62 The power-holders 
in that specific society made a distinction between social groups, and victims 
were victims because they belonged to another social group. The state had suc-
cessfully messaged that the fundamental human rights and dignity of those 
belonging to, or associated with, another group were not applicable. Therefore, 
what needs to be emphasised is the reaffirmation of a just social order, includ-
ing ‘messaging about the equality of persons under that order’.63 The equality 
of persons is the core here, as stated by Drumbl who proposed the norm - the 
absolute rejection of ‘discriminatory group-based killings’.64
For the Tribunal the two main stated purposes in sentencing perpetrators65 
were retribution and deterrence.66 The judges tailored retribution to encom-
pass what they had initially labelled ‘reprobation’, effectively, moral condemna-
tion. The Tribunal’s first judgment concluded that ‘the International Tribunal 
sees public reprobation and stigmatisation by the international community’ 
as a means to ‘express its indignation over heinous crimes and denounce the 
perpetrators’, and thus was ‘one of the essential functions of a prison sentence 
for a crime against humanity’.67 Broadly, therefore, punishment, embodied in a 
prison sentence, is a tangible denunciation of the crime as a whole. The phrase 
60 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World 
Politics (Norton, New York, 2011), p. 255.
61 Articles 37 and 38 of the Criminal Code of the sfry, which was in force throughout the 
country during the course of the war; see European Court of Human Rights, Maktouf and 
Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Applications Nos.  2312/08  and  34179/08, 18 July 
2013, para. 26.
62 Fisher, supra note 3, p. 64.
63 Ibid., p. 65.
64 Drumbl, supra note 2, p. 174.
65 Albeit, not articulated in all its judgments or consistently.
66 Barbora Holá, ‘Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and the ICTR’, 4(4) 
Amsterdam Law Review (2012) 7.
67 The Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 29 
November 1996, para. 64.
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‘public reprobation’ and the words ‘express’ and ‘denounce’ imply that the judges 
recognised that the sentence is symbolic and that they are being observed, not 
only by those in the courtroom but by a larger audience. The judgment did not 
identify who this audience is, but over the course of its lifetime the Tribunal rec-
ognised the people of the Balkan region as an audience. It translated court doc-
uments - case summaries, indictments, judgments, and summary judgments; 
it also broadcast trials live from 2000 onwards, opened offices and held legacy 
conferences across the countries of the former sfry.68 Despite the criticism that 
attention was given to this audience ‘too little, too late’,69 their actions denote 
that they recognised, and wished to communicate with them.
The Tribunal further believed that this expressive capacity was 
forward-looking, and in doing so it also recognised other audiences to 
which it wished to send messages. This purpose was general deterrence; it 
was sending the message to all persons caught up in conflict that heinous 
crimes such as torture can never be justified. The Kordić judgment recog-
nised that people’s mind-set during war is altered: ‘the unfortunate legacy 
of wars shows that … many perpetrators believe that violations of binding 
international norms can be lawfully committed, because they are fighting 
for a ‘just cause’.70 In this context, the judges asserted that the Tribunal’s 
punishment had an ‘educational function … aim[ed] at conveying the 
message that rules of international humanitarian law have to be obeyed 
under all circumstances. In doing so, the sentence seeks to internalise 
these rules’.71 The judges did not elaborate as to why these rules should 
be obeyed, but explicitly stated that they were sending this ‘message’ that 
‘international humanitarian and human rights law’72 should be obeyed at all 
times. The invocation of adherence to ihrl is a recognition of the victim, as 
core to ihrl is the dignity of each human, qua human, and having equal worth.
4 The Impact of uer on International Criminal Justice’s Expressive 
Values
This article limits its discussions to two particular messages the stakeholders 
in BiH received as the Tribunal granted uer and relates these to the theories 
68 See: https://www.icty.org/en/outreach/home, accessed 4 December 2019.
69 Janine Natalya Clark, ‘Plea Bargaining at the ICTY: Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation’, 20(2) 
The European Journal of International Law (2009) 415–436.
70 The Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Chamber 
Judgment 17 December 2004, para. 1087.
71 Ibid., paras. 1080–1081.
72 Ibid., para. 1081.
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of expressive punishment. The finding that moral condemnation was negated 
by uer spoke to many interviewees’ perceptions of the Tribunal’s key purpose. 
Of the 57 interviewees, 21 articulated that punishment was about sending 
the ‘message’ that the crimes were wrong and warranted punishment, using 
phrases such as ‘to show’, ‘send the message’, ‘to say’, etc. They spoke of the 
purpose of punishment having valuable expressive elements, specifically two 
of those identified by Feinberg: an authoritative disavowal and validation of 
the law.
4.1 Authoritative Disavowal Diluted at uer
The Tribunal seated in The Hague, established by the United Nations Security 
Council (unsc) in New York, with foreign judges, embodied to many of 
its supporters in BiH (watching the Tribunal on the television, hearing the 
judges and lawyers second hand as interpreters translated), the rather nebu-
lous international community. The judgments passed signified that universal 
principles were being recognised. Furthermore, the Tribunal itself articulated 
that it spoke on behalf of the international community – as above in the 
Erdemović judgment. Authors advocating for international criminal justice 
have argued that such tribunals can enhance their legitimacy by procedural 
fairness.73 One such measure is the personnel of the institution being inde-
pendent of the politics that created it. At the forefront of the icty were the 
judges. Under the Tribunal’s founding legal doctrine,74 those appointed were 
highly esteemed professionals presumed to be unbiased (by virtue of not being 
from the sfry). Thus, their decisions should be perceived as fair and ‘author-
itative’.75 Throughout the interviews those who were generally supportive of 
the icty echoed Shany’s proposition. Several asserted that they trusted icty 
judges given that they were ‘highly-educated people’76 who were ‘working in 
accordance with regulation and normative acts’.77 The Tribunal indicted those 
73 Luban, supra note 58, p. 579.
74 icty Statute, Article 13, required that ‘judges shall be persons of high moral character, 
impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective 
countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices’.
75 Yuval Shany, ‘Stronger Together? Legitimacy and Effectiveness of International Courts 
as Mutually Reinforcing or Undermining Notions’, in Nienke Grossman, Harlan Grant 
Cohen,  Andreas Føllesdal and Geir Ulfstein, Legitimacy and International Courts 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018), pp. 354–371.
76 Interview, Independent with professional experience engaging with victim-witnesses in 
Srebrenica, Sarajevo, 21 December 2017.
77 Interview, Judge, Sarajevo, 12 December 2017.
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suspected of atrocity crimes, held public trials78 and the judges sentenced 
those convicted to a term of imprisonment.
Punishment represented an authoritative disavowal of the crimes. In terms 
of Feinberg’s proposals, the Tribunal was categorically stating that the perpe-
trator had ‘no right to do what he did’.79 Yet, this punishment was rarely ful-
filled in practice. For ten of the interviewees uer was perceived as a direct 
negation of that condemnation. This sentiment was expressed by one inter-
viewee who queried:
can you morally condemn a certain person, a person’s behaviour … your 
condemning … is not a mere act of condemning but it has consequences 
and in this case it’s a prison sentence and if you do away with this … what 
remains of this initial act … the signal … of this moral condemnation [is 
a] question mark. And then we get back to the beginning … which is how 
far is it legitimate, or even legal to grant … an early release?80
For this interviewee, a non-native working for an igo, a lawyer, with over ten 
years of professional experience in BiH, the expression of moral condemnation 
was realised via the prison sentence. Condemnation by words alone would not 
be adequate, as he noted, it has to have ‘consequences’. When the perpetrator 
was granted uer, the sentence was not fulfilled. Further, his phrase, ‘then we 
get back to the beginning’ suggests that he, an audience of the message, looks 
back to the initial signal and queries the act of early release.
There was a notion of the trajectory of the declared sentence being under-
mined by the grant of uer. His query, ‘what remains of this initial act’ hints 
at the notion of the act being thwarted in some way. The sense of a trajec-
tory losing its course was expressed by a BiH Prosecutor who was frustrated 
by uer and asserted that the sentence declared should simply be fulfilled. He 
noted that the icty ‘should stick to the purpose of punishment – deterrence 
and sending the message’.81 Another igo interviewee, noting that he was a 
Serb, was bitterly disappointed with uer. Through his work, he engaged with 
smaller communities badly affected by the war. When asked if he believed uer 
could be reconciled with moral condemnation of the crime, he responded ‘if 
78 Eric Stover, The Witnesses: War Crimes and the Promise of Justice in The Hague (University 
of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2005), p. 144.
79 Feinberg, supra note 36, p. 103.
80 Interview, igo, Sarajevo, 21 December 2017.
81 Interview, Prosecutor, Eastern Sarajevo, 17 November 2017.
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you want to give this message then we should not more or less change that 
narrative and provide an early release … it’s wrong messaging’.82 He concludes 
that the Tribunal’s purpose has been distorted by uer. The Tribunal’s sentence 
expressed moral condemnation, but unconditional early release contradicted 
that. This is a case of ‘wrong messaging’; in his view the goal of the Tribunal has 
been shifted and effectively twisted.
These three quotations capture two elements of Feinberg’s example of an 
act of an authoritative disavowal of a wrong committed, and the notion of this 
disavowal to a wide audience. The punisher is not addressing the perpetrator 
alone in condemning their act, as noted by the Prosecutor in asserting that the 
purpose was ‘deterrence’ in terms of general prevention rather than specific 
deterrence for that perpetrator. Feinberg’s analogy of a nation state punishing 
a pilot of its own who has shot down another country’s aeroplane:
tells the world that the pilot had no right to do what he did, that his 
government does not condone that sort of thing. It testifies to govern-
ment A’s recognition of the violated rights of government B and, there-
fore, to the wrongfulness of the pilot’s act.83
The purpose of punishment is disavowal – the punisher ‘does not condone’ 
the wrongfulness of the act. Feinberg’s example hints at the why element, 
although he did not elucidate it. The wrong that has occurred is that the pilot 
has violated another’s rights; here, those rights are of the other state by virtue 
of their pilot being shot down, which is denoted as the wrong which is subse-
quently punished. The reason why punishment is required is that a wrong has 
been committed. Before exploring further how this why element was negated 
at uer, let us first examine the underlying reasons why people (authors, and 
most importantly, a significant number of interviewees) perceive these crimes 
as wrong and as requiring punishment.
4.2 Why this Authoritative Disavowal? A Vindication of Victims’ Value
Although Feinberg’s work scarcely mentions victims, and he is not writing in 
terms of atrocity crimes, a parallel can be drawn from the above quotation 
in relation to the ‘violated rights’ of government B, by virtue of having their 
pilot shot down, to the context of atrocity crimes and subsequent punishment 
by the icty. Feinberg implicitly asserted that there is a world order that rec-
ognises that violent crimes committed against any innocent individual are 
82 Interview, igo, Sarajevo, 1 December 2017.
83 Feinberg, supra note 36, p. 102.
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morally wrong – regardless of which government they belong to - and any gov-
ernment should punish such acts. Feinberg’s argument implies an underlying 
sentiment which is so deeply ingrained that scholars frequently feel no need to 
explicate it. Murder and non-consensual violent acts against others are unlaw-
ful in almost all societies.84 The following section draws on Hampton’s theory, 
which explicates why the law itself is valid. This, in turn, speaks to the signifi-
cance of the norm projection element of punishment for atrocity crimes, and 
the subsequent harm that is done at the blanket grant of uer for perpetrators.
This element of the expressive value of punishment, a recognition of vic-
tims’ value, was proposed explicitly by Hampton, and supported by Glasgow,85 
though similarly to Feinberg, neither was justifying punishment in the context 
of atrocity crimes. Nevertheless, victims’ value can be applied to any victim 
anywhere on the basis of our ‘shared humanity’.86 For Hampton, punishment 
is the means by which society expresses that all human beings have an intrin-
sic value. This reason for punishment was articulated by one interviewee, in 
relation to perpetrators of atrocity crimes. She argued, ‘sentencing somebody 
to prison … it sends a message … [it] basically shows that the world recog-
nises the amount of crime, that the victims were innocent and that persons 
… have been guilty for what they have been convicted of ’.87 Additionally, the 
interviewee affirmed that the expressive act of punishment has audiences and 
she identified two. First, victims are an audience, as she reasons that survivors, 
direct or indirect victims, are being provided with some satisfaction by the per-
petrator’s being punished. Second, the world is an audience and punishment 
signals that the perpetrator has done wrong, namely, they harmed victims. 
More broadly, her statement implied that victims perceived their perpetra-
tors being punished as a recognition of their worth. This was noted - in the 
negative - by one interviewee in the Republika Srpska (rs) who said that the 
Western powers dominating the unsc – the US, the UK and France - failed to 
take preventive action against atrocities because the ‘Balkan[s] was too orient 
for them, the victims were Muslims’.88 Although punishment was easier than 
prevention it was nevertheless significant as it symbolised that the interna-
tional community cared somewhat about the victims – that they were not ‘too 
orient’.
84 Sikkink, supra note 60, p. 255.
85 Andrew Glasgow, ‘The Expressivist Theory of Punishment Defended’, 34 Law and 
Philosophy (2015) 601–631.
86 Duff, supra note 54, p. 601.
87 Interview, ngo, Sarajevo, 27 October 2017.
88 Interview, ngo, Banja Luka, 24 November 2017.
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A further reason why punishment could be perceived as bringing a sense 
of satisfaction to victims was due to the rhetoric of the Tribunal itself. The 
Tribunal routinely claimed that they considered the welfare of victims. For 
example, a 2003 judgment stated that victims as well as perpetrators mattered 
in the administration of justice: ‘The Tribunal is not only mandated to search 
for and record, as far as possible the truth of what happened in the former 
Yugoslavia, but also to bring justice to both victims and their relatives and to per-
petrators’.89 This assertion continues today as the icty website lists amongst 
its achievements that it brought justice to victims by giving them a voice and 
establishing facts’.90 Here, the icty stated that by dispensing retributive jus-
tice to perpetrators it simultaneously brought justice to victims.
4.3 Plavšić
The significance of victims’ value being vindicated through punishment is best 
exemplified by the premature termination of punishment of one convicted 
perpetrator – Biljana Plavšić. Plavšić’s uer was raised, without prompting, in 
24 of the 51 interviews. On 27 February 2003, Plavšić was sentenced to 11 years 
imprisonment for crimes against humanity - persecutions on political, racial 
and religious grounds. She was at the forefront of the ethnic cleansing in the 
rs.
Prior to the conflict, Plavšić was an esteemed biologist teaching at the 
University of Sarajevo. As the sfry broke up and ethnicity became a driving 
force as the six Republics sought independence, Plavšić became politically 
active. In 1990, together with Radovan Karadžić (her initial co-accused), she 
co-founded the Serbian Democratic Party (sds). Her war-time propagations 
exhibit Hampton’s notion of perpetrators evaluating themselves and debasing 
their victims. Plavšić, employing her biologist expertise, spoke with conviction 
that ‘Muslims are genetically spoiled material’.91 When degrading the Muslim 
population she asserted the status of the Serbs: ‘we are upset by a rising num-
ber of mixed marriages between Serbs and Muslims, for they allow genes to be 
exchanged between ethnic groups, and lead subsequently to the degeneration 
of Serb nationality’.92 On this basis she called for mass deportation: ‘I would 
89 The Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Sentencing Judgment, Case No. IT-94-2-S, 18 December 
2003, para. 120. Emphasis added.
90 See icty website: https://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/achievements, accessed 20 July 
2020.
91 Plavšić in Svet, 6 September 1993, cited Jelena Subotić, ‘The Cruelty of False Remorse: 
Biljana Plavšić at The Hague’, 36(1) Southeastern Europe (2012) 42.
92 Plavšić in Oslobođenje, May 1994, cited in Subotić, ibid.
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like for us to cleanse Eastern Bosnia … To tell you the truth I am not very well 
disposed towards them [Muslims]. But if I want to be at peace, I must give 
them something … because then they would not keep disturbing me. This is 
how I perceive that 30 per cent’.93 She was initially indicted for eight charges, 
including genocide, to which she pleaded not guilty in January 2001 but after a 
plea agreement in October 2002 she pled guilty to one count: persecutions on 
political, racial, and religious grounds (crimes against humanity).
Plavšić delivered a statement of guilt as part of her plea bargain. This state-
ment epitomised international criminal justice’s expressive value, a moral con-
demnation of the crime and a vindication of the victims, being fulfilled. As 
she read out her statement before the Trial Chamber the public en masse in 
the sfry watched and heard her as it was televised. Her acceptance of moral 
condemnation and the norm underlying it was apparent in two sentences of 
her statement: ‘Our leadership, of which I was a necessary part, led an effort 
which victimized countless innocent people. Explanations of self-defence and 
survival offer no justification’.94 Hampton’s proposed norm, the recognition of 
victims’ worth, is directly referenced by Plavšić as she described the victims 
as ‘innocent people’. Further, the acceptance of the wrong, rather than the 
acceptance of illegality, is spoken to as she recognised that her actions had ‘no 
justification’.95
Although this statement of remorse was not accepted by all audiences in 
BiH,96 it was significant nonetheless and widely reported. The significance of 
remorse to international criminal justice more broadly was argued by Karstedt 
who declared that ‘any admission of guilt and … moral responsibility address 
vital exigencies of the international criminal courts and tribunals, their ration-
ale, justification, and legitimacy’.97 The significance of remorse, as argued by 
Karstedt, does appear to be supported by the fact that Plavšić’s latter rejection 
was found deeply offensive, so much so that it had stayed with interviewees 
six years later.
93 Plavšić in Svet, 6 September 1993, cited in Subotić, ibid.
94 Plavšić’s statement of guilt, see: icty website: https://www.icty.org/en/features/
statements-guilt, accessed 26 June 2020.
95 Ibid.
96 Emir Suljagić, a Srebrenica massacre survivor, said, ‘I feel like crying. There was nothing 
human in her words, not a note of apology. She didn’t do it for me. She did it for the 
Serbian cause’, cited Subotić, supra note 91, 46.
97 Sara Karstedt, ‘“I would Prefer to be Famous”: Comparative Perspectives on the Reentry 
of War Criminals Sentenced at Nuremberg and The Hague’, 28(4) International Criminal 
Justice Review (2018) 384.
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Plavšić’s uer was recalled, either as the interviewees’ first recollection of 
hearing about uer or being the ‘best evidence against early release’.98 She was 
the most high-level political perpetrator who, at trial, accepted the moral con-
demnation of the judges as they passed the sentence. However, her charade 
became clear as she retracted her expressed remorse in an interview she gave 
in prison99 and the ‘cruelty of her false remorse’100 was extenuated as she was 
granted uer.101
Plavšić was publicly welcomed back to the country by an ongoing denier 
of the genocide in Srebrenica, rs President Dodik. His private jet brought 
Plavšić to Belgrade where she was greeted by a well-orchestrated ‘ticker-tape 
parade’.102 A few days later she received a similar welcome in Banja Luka, BiH. 
She thanked her supporters and decried the Tribunal, saying that she regret-
ted none of her actions during the war and explained that her guilty plea was 
for pragmatic purposes only.103 At a minimum, one interviewee asserted that 
Plavšić’s uer distorted the message of moral condemnation:
Condemnation … to say ‘this is wrong … and now you are being put away 
because we want to send this message to everyone’ … Plavšić, there are so 
many people who still think she is a hero and her early release didn’t help 
spread that message. She was convicted, but so what … she is released … 
all good. So that … message got scrambled completely.104
The belief that early release distorted the original message of moral condem-
nation was reflected in the use of the word ‘message’ as having negative and 
tangible consequences. The ngo Director, who had asserted that Plavšić’s 
release was the ‘best evidence against early release’, applied this to the bigger 
picture of uer in BiH as he reflected that: ‘It’s a message - you can achieve your 
political aims with war … punishment [but] you will survive. Everything will 
be okay, and we will give you [uer] and further [you] become a hero in … your 
98 Interview, ngo Director, Sarajevo, 7 November 2017.
99 Vi Magazine, cited Choi, supra note 8, 1783.
100 Subotić, supra note 91.
101 Olivera Simić, ‘Bringing “Justice” Home? Bosnians, War Criminals and the Interaction 
between the Cosmopolitan and the Local’, 12(7) German Law Journal (2011) 1401–1402.
102 Interview, Senior Staff Member, The Hague, 24 January 2017.
103 Olivera Simić, ‘“I Would Do the Same Again”: In Conversation with Biljana Plavšić’, 28(4) 
International Criminal Justice Review (2018) 321.
104 Interview, Independent with professional experience engaging with victim-witnesses in 
Srebrenica, Sarajevo, 21 December 2017.
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nation, your ethnic group or religious group’.105 Authors have detailed the ‘cel-
ebratory homecomings’106 that icty convicts, especially high-level perpetra-
tors, receive as they return to the region. They outline how perpetrators portray 
themselves as defenders of their communities107 and are welcomed as such.108 
These ‘celebratory’ returns, where perpetrators and their supporters reject the 
‘stigmatisation’ that the Tribunal’s punishment signified, were spoken of elo-
quently by one interviewee, a prominent Serb human rights activist in the rs. 
He reflected: ‘he didn’t change [and] he’s coming back a hero … instead of the 
shame, instead of the guilt … all the things that these war criminals [were] 
fighting for … it’s legitimised, privileged … as their … war glory effort’.109
Another interviewee, an ngo representative in Sarajevo, was deeply frus-
trated with uer. He believed that the Tribunal should be aware of the local 
context and make the message of condemnation categorical by not granting 
any early releases. In contrast to the rs human rights activist, who looked at 
the big picture, this interviewee’s emphasis was on the smaller communities 
where perpetrators return as heroes, ‘they are coming into that area, where 
they did the crime, to be welcomed by the folks living there as a hero, and I am 
also living there, in the neighbourhood - how will you feel? You know, again, 
what’s the message?’110 He was referring to minority populations and victims. 
They had been ethnically cleansed from the area, some had returned, and now 
those who had instigated or participated in their forced removal were glorified 
in that same place. Also in Sarajevo, an ngo Director considered these local 
returns as he reflected, ‘those who have been terrorised or people who suffered 
during the war you know by individuals who are now being released earlier - 
what kind of a message does that send to them?’111
These interviewees implied that uer could trigger a sense of intimida-
tion for victims who had been terrorised during the war. This was affirmed by 
Munira Subašić, Mothers of Srebrenica, who queried, ‘How can we be expected 
to return to our homes in Srebrenica when the project to destroy us still lives in 
105 Interview, ngo Director, Sarajevo, 7 November 2017.
106 Trbovc, supra note 8, 408.
107 Katarina Ristić, ‘The Media Negotiations of War Criminals and Their Memoirs: The 
Emergence of the “ICTY Celebrity”’, 28(4) International Criminal Justice Review (2018) 
391–405.
108 Although these scholars do not make the link between early release and the perpetrators’ 
homecomings.
109 Interview, ngo, Banja Luka, 24 November 2017.
110 Interview, ngo Representative, Sarajevo, 2 November 2017.
111 Interview, ngo Director, Sarajevo, 6 November 2017.
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the heads of the Bosnian Serb leadership?’112 uer effectively goes against the 
norm that was projected as perpetrators were sentenced. This norm, is sum-
marised by Luban as ‘international criminal law’s moral truth … the criminal-
ity of political violence against the innocent, even when your side hates the 
innocent as an enemy’.113 uer was ‘twisting this whole idea of justice’114 as it 
allowed them to be greeted as heroes, their crimes justified, their victims belit-
tled, all within the context of a post-conflict ethnically divided state.115 This 
was the case in BiH and could be replicated elsewhere.
4.4 The Audiences, the Messages of International Criminal Justice and 
their Negation at uer
Unconditional early release as ‘counter-logic’ to punishment, a negation of the 
ICTY’s moral message and a weakening of the vindication of victims’ value, 
was seen as applicable to international criminal justice more broadly. Over 
one-third of interviewees perceived the icty punishing perpetrators of atroc-
ity crimes committed in the Balkans as having significance beyond their own 
borders.116 This perception signifies that the icty, as an international criminal 
justice mechanism, can provide lessons for other such endeavours.
Analysis of the interview data fits with Amann’s argument that, for legal 
expressivists, ‘the intended audience … is not just the wrongdoer … it is also 
the Everyone … the law-abider and the law-maker, the activist and the private 
citizen, and even the potential victim, today and tomorrow’.117 The idea that 
‘the Everyone’ is addressed and receive messages as international criminal jus-
tice punishes came out strongly in interviews.
Other authors have advocated for specific audiences to be targeted, or sent 
particular messages when punishing atrocity perpetrators.118 For some, polit-
ical and social groups (both elites and their followers) are a key audience of 
112 Subotić, supra note 91.
113 Luban, supra note 58.
114 Interview, Prosecutor, Federation, BiH, 21 November 2017.
115 Beiber, supra note 10.
116 Nineteen interviewees in BiH referenced the purpose of punishment as showing ‘the 
world’, ‘everyone’, ‘other leaders’ that such crimes were wrong, should or will be punished. 
Thus, indicative of this recognition of the icty having a broader audience than the Balkan 
region.
117 Diane Marie Amann, ‘Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide’, 2 International 
Criminal Law Review (2002) 93–143.
118 Mirjan Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’, 83(1) Chicago-Kent 
Law Review (2008) 329–365.
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the no impunity norm.119 The no impunity norm is realised by the punishment 
itself; the moral condemnation and victim’s value are the messages encom-
passed in the act of punishment. Fisher argued that this no impunity norm 
should be expressed by focusing on punishing high-level perpetrators120 of 
atrocities. This prosecutorial strategy, she asserted, would affirm a global order 
wherein groups of human beings are free to organise socially and politically. 
Luban recognised both these elites and followers as relevant audiences of what 
he labelled the ‘norm projection’.121 Luban suggested that this norm projec-
tion may have a deterrent effect, that foot-soldiers internalise the ‘moral unac-
ceptability of [discriminatory and violent] politics’.122
Fisher’s proposition was echoed in BiH. Interviewees recognised other 
members of the international community as being an audience for the icty. 
The President of a regional court in BiH argued that punishment of atrocities 
‘sends a message to the entire world that this kind of behaviour during war 
… is not allowed and it should not happen again’.123 Likewise, a judge at the 
War Crimes Chamber, BiH State Court, said that ‘the icty … sends a message, 
to the people of Myanmar now’.124 These two judges perceived the icty as 
being able to send a powerful message not only to the region but across the 
world. Additionally, that the message outlived the Tribunal was reflected by 
the judge’s use of the word ‘now’. Further, ‘these people’ could encompass not 
only the leaders instigating the crimes but their followers too.
As the conviction and subsequent punishment projects the message of no 
impunity, does the early termination of the punishment undermine this mes-
sage? As unintentional as this may be, the answer for several interviewees was 
a clear ‘yes’. In terms of receiving audiences, uer by the icty not only had a 
negative impact for the societies in the sfry, it also sent a negative message to 
others. For one interviewee, uer was a direct contravention of the no impu-
nity norm. Most worryingly for her, state leaders who instigate the atrocity 
crimes received this message. She asserted that uer is: ‘sending the message to 
the world that crimes can be committed. You will be released, you can change 
the border[s] of territories, you can forcibly move people, and you can change 
ethnic structures of one nation for your own personal interest’.125
119 Drumbl, supra note 2; Luban, supra note 58; and Damaška, ibid.
120 Fisher, supra note 3, p. 6.
121 Luban, supra note 58, p. 576.
122 Drumbl, supra note 2, p. 174.
123 Interview, Judge, Federation, BiH, 21 November 2017.
124 Interview, Judge, War Crimes Chamber, State Court, Sarajevo, 18 October 2017.
125 Interview, ngo, Sarajevo, 14 December 2017. Twenty years after the war, the unhcr, in 
2015, reported that 98,000 people remained internally displaced in BiH, and the issue of 
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Her focus on ethnic cleansing being trivialised by uer may have arisen as 
she was working with a number of war victims internally displaced due to 
the terms of the Dayton Agreement, which divided the country along ethnic 
lines.126 Every day she witnessed directly the on-going harms experienced by 
displaced people, victims of these perpetrators who were now being granted 
early release from their punishment. Her comment indicated further that she 
perceived parallels with other countries experiencing atrocities whereby the 
crimes’ purposes, ethnic cleansing, are achieved, and through uer this mass 
displacement is being relativised.
The disappointment and frustration caused by uer, for most interviewees, 
was due to the gravity of the crime,127 aggravated by the typology of the perpe-
trators, their lack of remorse, all compounded by its unconditional nature. The 
first three factors (gravity, typology and lack of remorse) speak to the specific 
nature of atrocity crimes. The vast majority of interviewees (with the excep-
tion of most judges, one ngo representative and one survivor) perceived uer 
as both unexpected and inappropriate for extra-ordinary crimes.128 Words 
such as ‘surprised’,129 ‘shocked’,130 in addition to ‘disappointed’131 and ‘devas-
tated’132 were used in response to their initial thoughts on hearing of uer. 
This included practising lawyers, including those defending persons accused 
of atrocity crimes in BiH courts. Approximately one-third of the interviewees 
raised the issue of proportionality in the icty’s early termination of punish-
ment of atrocity crimes.
uer was perceived as a derision of the proportionality element of retribu-
tion, including the moral condemnation of the crime. This perception was 
expressed by one ngo Director who believed that uer was a ‘total relativisa-
tion of the crime’ and his emphasis was on proportionality: ‘we totally lose the 
sense for justice … this is not a traffic incident … we are talking about crimes 
minority returns was still an issue – ‘minority returns in ethnically cleansed areas’. See: 
http://reporting.unhcr.org/node/15810.
126 Diane Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice: The ICTY’s Impact in Bosnia and Serbia (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2018).
127 Seventeen of the 57 interviewees raised the gravity of the crimes committed, the mass 
number of victims, the ethnic hatred motivation, and/or the cruelty of the crimes.
128 One interviewee, an ngo staff member, responded in a similar vein that he was not 
surprised as it was a practice that happened in every country. Later, however, he expressed 
his anger that the practice was unconditional.
129 Interview, ngo, Banja Luka, 24 November 2017.
130 Interview, ngo, Sarajevo, 27 October 2017.
131 Interview, ngo Director, Sarajevo, 7 November 2017.
132 Interview, ngo Director, Sarajevo, 6 November 2017.
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against humanity … grave breaches of international law’.133 This interviewee 
described uer as his ‘biggest disappointment’ and believed his sense of frus-
tration would be shared by others. He asked rhetorically ‘after two-thirds of 
imprisonment they are released - what kind of message are we sending to 
victims?’134 His question implied that victims were disrespected when uer 
was granted, echoes Hampton’s idea of victims’ vindication via punishment. 
What Hampton argued for the national law is applicable to international crim-
inal justice also, ‘behaviour is expressive, and the state’s behaviour in the face 
of an act of attempted degradation against a victim is itself something that 
will either annul or contribute further to the diminishment of the victim’.135 
Hampton’s reference was to impunity for crimes rather than the premature 
ending of punishment, but the interviewees’ opinions illustrate that, just as the 
punishment sent a message, so too did its premature ending.
Interviewees, in addition to expressing their disappointment in the 
Tribunal’s uer, proffered what could justify an early release. If early release 
had been undertaken along their proposals this may have countered the per-
ceived relativisation of the crimes. Their recommendations also speak to the 
purpose of punishment as being a moral condemnation of the crime and a vin-
dication of the crimes’ victims. Their recommendations also provide lessons 
for international criminal justice more broadly.
5 Maintaining International Criminal Justice’s Expressive Value
This section turns to perpetrators’ remorse as a justification for early release. 
This was proposed by many of the interviewees. Researching in the field of 
international criminal justice is often not limited to exploring theories but 
striving for improvements in the system. Thus, making recommendations call-
ing for adopting or amending practices based on empirical findings has the 
potential to contribute to enhancing its acceptance.136 Its audiences are more 
likely to listen to the messages it wishes to convey.
133 Interview, ngo Director, Sarajevo, 7 November 2017.
134 Ibid.
135 Hampton, supra note 44, 1692.
136 Sarah M.H Nouwen, ‘“As you Set out for Ithaka”: Practical, Epistemological, Ethical, and 
Existential Questions about Socio-Legal Empirical Research in Conflict’, 27(1) Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2014) 227–260; Marina Aksenova, Elies van Sliedrget and 
Stephan Parmentier, Breaking the Cycle of Mass Atrocities: Criminological and Socio-Legal 
Approaches in International Criminal Law (Hart, Oxford, 2019).
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From a human rights perspective, exploring this societal relationship is impor-
tant as a perpetrator’s rehabilitation under ihrl encompasses their ‘social 
rehabilitation’.137 This implies that reintegration into the society, and how best 
to achieve this, should be considered. Additionally, ihrl obliges states to tailor 
imprisonment for perpetrators’ return to society.138
Some authors have queried whether a state should concern itself with 
repentance,139 which they argue could violate a person’s autonomy – that a 
state power should not manipulate people to be repentant. It is not proposed 
here that perpetrators must be rehabilitated but that they have the opportu-
nity to be rehabilitated140 and where they claim to be rehabilitated, they should 
provide evidence. This is not unreasonable, especially given the gravity of the 
crimes, their motivation and context (based on ethnic hatred) and the divided 
society to which they return. In the parameters of icl, it is, in fact, required 
by the International Criminal Court’s Rules and Procedure of Evidence. These 
rules provide criteria the judges ‘shall take into account’ in considering an 
application for a reduction of sentence for perpetrators of atrocity crimes. 
Although the Rules do not use the word ‘rehabilitation’, they do imply personal 
reformation and perpetrators’ capacity to return to society; the two principles 
as set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr). 
The icc’s Judges who consider a perpetrator’s request for a reduction in sen-
tence evaluate, inter alia, ‘(a) the conduct of the sentenced person while in 
detention, which shows a genuine dissociation from his or her crime; (b) the 
prospect of the resocialization and successful resettlement of the sentenced per-
son; (c) whether the early release of the sentenced person would give rise to 
significant social instability’.141 This third factor explicitly requires the judges 
to consider society, not only the perpetrator. The icc’s Rules are highlighted 
because the elements were alluded to by interviewees. Further, these Rules 
were written for the purposes of a reduction of sentence for perpetrators of 
atrocity crimes, whose crimes and context of return can form a baseline com-
parison. Finally, these rules were available for the icty’s President and judicial 
137 iccpr, 1966.
138 iccpr, Article 10(3); and UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners 
1955, Rule 65.
139 Andrew Von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), pp. 
73–74 responded to by John Tasioulas, ‘Repentance and the Liberal State’, 4(2) Ohio State 
Journal of Criminal Law (2007) 498.
140 In accordance with ihrl.
141 icc Rules and Procedure of Evidence, Rule 223.
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colleagues to consider at the first application for early release,142 and subse-
quently thereafter.
The first factor the icc judges must consider - ‘dissociation from his or her 
crime’ - on plain reading encompasses the notion of remorse. The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines ‘dissociation … [as] the act of showing that you do 
not support or agree with something’.143 Additionally, throughout scholarship, 
dissociation from the crime is encompassed in a perpetrator’s apology for the 
crime, as noted by Garvey who asserted that ‘apology is the self ’s way of accept-
ing responsibility for its wrongdoing but at the same time disavowing the 
wrong’144 and where genuine can be of value.145 This definition and belief in its 
value is supported by the icc’s two decisions on reduction of sentences, both 
of which encompass elements of remorse as described by BiH interviewees: 
an acknowledgement of crimes as a wrong, recognition of the harm caused to 
victims and an apology. The first icc decision on an application for a reduc-
tion of sentence rejected Lubanga’s claimed disassociation from his crime as 
it determined that his expression of remorse ‘did not acknowledge [Lubanga’s] 
own culpability [or an] express[ion] of remorse or regret to the victims of 
crimes for which he was convicted’.146 In contrast, regarding Katanga’s applica-
tion, the judges determined that Katanga’s two actions during imprisonment 
constituted evidence of dissociation from the crimes. First was his withdrawal 
of an appeal against conviction, thereby an apparent acceptance of the Trial 
Chamber’s finding of guilt. Second was his public expression of regret to vic-
tims. He had a filmed apology to his victims – which satisfied the judges that 
he had ‘genuinely dissociated from his crimes’.147 Thus, his application for a 
reduction of sentence was granted. A genuine expression of remorse, regret for 
specific actions, weighed strongly in his favour.
The icc’s consideration of perpetrators’ dissociation from the crime 
reflected much of what interviewees proposed as measures of genuine remorse. 
Expressed remorse was a positive act with a receiving audience. This factor was 
142 D. Erdemović, Early Release Decision, June 1999, made public July 2008.
143 See https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/dissociation - 
emphasis added.
144 Stephen P. Garvey, ‘Punishment as Atonement’ 46(6) UCLA Law Review (1999) 1816.
145 Olivera Simić and Barbora Holá, ‘A War Criminal’s Remorse: the Case of Landžo and 
Plavšić’, 21 Human Rights Review (2020) 271.
146 icc Decision on the review concerning reduction of sentence of Mr. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, 22 September 2015, ICC-01/04-01/06, para. 46.
147 icc Decision on the review concerning reduction of sentence of Mr. Germain Katanga, 13 
November 2015, ICC-01/04-01/07, para. 50.
yarnell
International Criminal Law Review 21 (2021) 67-96Downloaded from Brill.com11/09/2021 12:21:07PM
via free access
93
put bluntly by one prosecutor who said, ‘You want early release? Then show 
us you are sorry’.148 The use of the phrase ‘show us’ implies an expression to a 
watchful audience – that an act is seen. Fourteen of these interviewees delved 
further into what should be communicated. For them the concept of remorse 
was linked to an acknowledgement of the crimes,149 a recognition of harm 
to victims,150 and a public apology.151 These threefold elements echoed traits 
encompassed in Proeve and Tudor’s model of ‘a remorseful person’. This is a 
person who ‘thinks about what he did, how it affected other people, and may 
experience a sense of a changed self ’.152 That is, the crime is acknowledged, 
the harm caused to the victim is acknowledged and, as a result of this changed 
mind-set, the perpetrator may wish to provide an apology. Personal reforma-
tion and resocialisation were highlighted by one BiH judge who argued that 
the purpose of punishment was for perpetrators’ ‘confrontation with the atroc-
ities committed … for them to show remorse and to offer apology’.153
The emphasis on the acknowledgment was for most interviewees about 
the recognition of victims’ harm and for societal well-being. These findings 
illustrate some authors’ assertions that apologies hold significance as they can 
be a means to ‘vindicate victims and humble offenders’.154 Thirteen of the 26 
interviewees who wanted a perpetrator to demonstrate remorse believed an 
apology should be made public. One prosecutor, recognising that verifying the 
sincerity of remorse was difficult, proposed that a perpetrator should ‘back up 
his remorse with a public apology to victims’.155 For him, this public apology 
was not for the victims directly but rather for societal recognition of victims. 
One survivor articulated this, as she emphasised the lack of recognition of vic-
tims throughout the interview. She reflected that in the rs none of ‘the per-
petrators … had made public statements, nor did they offer their apologies’ 
and stressed that ‘people would believe them … rather than the victims’.156 
148 Interview, Prosecutor Eastern Sarajevo, 17 November 2017.
149 Six noted that key to remorse was the perpetrator’s acknowledgement of the crime they 
were convicted of was morally wrong.
150 Seven noted that encompassed in remorse was a recognition of harm done to victims.
151 Thirteen argued that perpetrators to be granted an early release should publicly apologise 
for their crimes.
152 Michael Proeve and Stephen Tudor, Remorse: Psychological and Jurisprudential Perspectives 
(Ashgate Publishing, Farnham, 2010) p. 171.
153 Interview, Judge, Sarajevo, 12 December 2017.
154 Stephanos Bibas and Richard A. Bierschbach, ‘Integrating Remorse and Apology into 
Criminal Procedure’ 114(1) The Yale Law Journal (2004) 85–148, 143 referencing Duff, supra 
note 40, 95.
155 Interview, Prosecutor, Federation, BiH, 9 November 2017.
156 Interview, rs, 23 November 2017.
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For her, perpetrators’ apology would be a message of moral condemnation of 
the crimes and a recognition of the victims.157 Others also took this approach 
and believed that the Tribunal, not only the perpetrator, had responsibility to 
make these apologies known. One interviewee advocated ‘remorse expressed 
and for people to know about it, with outreach. That would generate so much 
for the region, a public apology’.158 This proposal is in line with Sloane’s rec-
ommendation for the utilisation of the ‘expressive capacity of international 
law’ which calls for ‘greater attention to communication and public education 
strategies in international criminal law … making the … sentencing process … 
express the extraordinarily high level of international condemnation of [inter-
national] crimes’.159 The same rationale could be applied when the declared 
sentence is prematurely terminated.
5.2 The Desired Message of Punishment for Atrocity Crimes
Remorse for the crimes and a recognition of the moral rather than legal wrong 
of the crime speaks to the significance of the norm projection element of pun-
ishment. This norm projection of the micro-message, an understanding of the 
dignity of each individual, based on our shared humanity, regardless of race, 
ethnicity, religion, is key in punishing atrocity crimes. This was articulated by 
one interviewee who argued that punishment should express that there is ‘no 
national reason’ for crimes.160 An internalisation of this norm would mean that 
individuals would have a sense of a shared humanity with all other individuals 
regardless of their specific religious, ethnic or political group.
Based on these findings, with this desired message in mind, caution is noted 
here in relation to focusing on the macro-message of the norm, perceived 
by Fisher, which placed emphasis on the group desire and right of groups to 
socially organise, although she advocated for this message to be projected to 
the international audience rather than the local community. It accentuates 
distinctions rather than commonalities. Perpetrators convicted by the icty 
had frequently committed crimes based on the victim’s ethnicity, or their 
157 icc Decision on the review concerning reduction of sentence of Mr. Germain Katanga, 
13 November 2015, ICC-01/04-01/07, ‘Katanga’s filmed apology … may be a benefit to 
victims from an apology being seen, not only by them, but also by the broader community, 
including those who may be considered ‘supporters’ of the sentenced person … Such an 
apology … can also lead to a broader recognition and acknowledgement of the harms that 
were done to the victims’, para. 101.
158 Interview, Embassy Staff Member, Sarajevo, 13 December 2017.
159 Sloane, supra note 3, 84.
160 Interview, Prosecutor, Eastern Sarajevo, 17 November 2017.
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affiliation with an ethnic group.161 If, however, a simpler, more fundamental 
message can be projected, namely that all humans are equal regardless of eth-
nicity, nationality etc., leaders of groups would find it more difficult to shift a 
mind-set towards group affiliation. A mind-set which focuses on groups’ rights 
emphasises differences and immediately opens up the potential for division 
rather than universality.
6 Conclusions
To conclude, based on research in BiH, there are three main reasons why inter-
national criminal justice should emphasise its expressive capacity and three 
subsequent recommendations for it to do so.
First, atrocity crimes in the context of ethnic conflict are fundamentally dif-
ferent to ordinary crimes due to their discriminatory motive or perpetration 
within a context of group-based hatred. Atrocity crimes happen in a context 
and in post-conflict society elements of that context may be ongoing. In rela-
tion to uer this means that, when the perpetrators return to the community, 
their social reintegration is radically different to that of perpetrators of ordi-
nary crimes. Any institution considering a grant of early release to a perpe-
trator who plans to return to a post-conflict society should take into account 
that society, and the perpetrator’s willingness to respectfully return to it. This 
is not an unreasonable proposal. It is in line with the second element of the 
notion of rehabilitation under ihrl, the perpetrator’s ‘social reformation’.162 
Although it may not be the normal role of a judge, where they are tasked with 
this responsibility, they should fulfil it to the best of their ability. This recom-
mendation appears to have been adopted by the current Tribunal President163 
and at the icc. Future icts and Courts which consider early release for atroc-
ity perpetrators may be able to prevent the message of moral condemnation 
and vindication of victims being negated.
161 The Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković, Case No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial 
Chamber Judgment, 22 February 2001, para. 592.
162 Article 10(3) iccpr.
163 Prosecutor v. Miroslav Bralo, Public Redacted Version, Decision on the Early Release of 
Miroslav Bralo, 31 December 2019, whereby UNIRMCT President Agius noted that, ‘it is 
not appropriate to look at the rehabilitation of perpetrators of genocide, crimes against 
humanity or war crimes through the exact paradigm as rehabilitation of perpetrators of 
domestic or ordinary crimes’, para. 38.
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Second, punishment of perpetrators of atrocity crimes (mass victimisation 
motivated by or within the context of group-based hatred) symbolises the con-
demnation of the act of hatred and is simultaneously a recognition of the dignity 
of the victims. Consequently, uer was widely perceived of as a negation of the 
expression of condemnation and vindication of the victims. With this finding in 
mind, early release (unconditional or not) of perpetrators should be explained to 
stakeholders in post-conflict societies to counter these messages.164
Third, primarily due to its own rhetoric, many stakeholders, especially vic-
tims, expected more from the icty than its ‘sole purpose’ of bringing perpetra-
tors to justice – which was its core mandate under the unscr. This is important 
to emphasise as international criminal justice is fundamentally about criminal 
accountability, despite some aspirations, expressed by scholars and others, of 
bringing voice to victims, providing an authoritative truth or being a means of 
reconciliation. Findings from BiH showed that many victims wanted criminal 
justice for the crimes, and although uer had cut justice short, ‘that some jus-
tice was done’165 was better than none. Stakeholders were deeply disappointed, 
and one factor was that the Tribunal had promised more than it could achieve.
At a practical level, international criminal justice can enhance its expres-
sive capacity by having a ‘greater degree of realism’.166 International criminal 
tribunals and courts should not purport to do more than they are mandated, 
or able to do. They should focus on fulfilling, to the best of their abilities, their 
core mandate: holding perpetrators to account through a fair trial. When unre-
alistic promises are made, they are heard and this can lead to disappointment 
for those who have already suffered, the victims.
These three recommendations are reasonable and in accordance with inter-
national human rights standards. Moreover, they are straightforward; they 
could be followed by practitioners simply by bearing in mind the old truism – 
that justice should be seen to be done. Bearing this in mind, practitioners would 
hopefully be more aware that all actions express messages. Perhaps then they 
would be more likely to consider the people whom justice is meant to serve in 
this its final dispensation, that is, the grant, where appropriate, of early release 
from imprisonment to perpetrators of atrocities.
164 Again, President Agius adopted this practice as he denied early release to Bralo, stating, 
‘I consider that it is in the interest of transparency to identify some of the principles that 
guide my reasoning’; ibid., para. 38.
165 Diane Orentlicher, That Someone Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia 
(Open Society Justice Institutive and ictj, New York, 2010) p. 34.
166 Carsten Stahn, ‘Between ‘Faith’ and ‘Facts’: By What Standards Should We Assess 
International Criminal Justice?’, 25(2) Leiden Journal of International Law (2012) 257.
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